This paper evaluates the effectiveness of a new index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) product designed to compensate for area average predicted livestock mortality loss in northern Kenya, where previous work has established the presence of poverty traps. We simulate household-specific wealth dynamics based on a model parameterized using rich panel and experimental data from the region. The simulations allow us to investigate patterns of willingness to pay for asset index insurance that is imperfectly correlated with individuals' loss experience. The bifurcated livestock dynamics associated with the poverty trap gives rise to insurance valuation that is highly nonlinear in individual herd size. Willingness to pay among vulnerable groups who most need insurance are, on average, lower than commercially viable rates but subsidization of IBLI premiums appears to offer more cost-effective poverty reduction than direct transfers to the poor.
Introduction
Index insurance has gained widespread interest in recent years as an instrument for reducing uninsured risk in poor rural areas that typically lack access to commercial insurance products. These financial instruments make indemnity payments based on realizations of an underlying index -based on some objectively measured random variable -relative to a pre-specified threshold, the "strike" (Barnett et al. 2008) . Index insurance offers significant potential advantages over traditional insurance. Because indemnity payments are not based on individual claims, insurance companies and insured clients need only monitor the index to know when payments are due. This sharply reduces the transaction costs of monitoring and verifying losses, while also eliminating the asymmetric information problems (i.e., adverse selection and moral hazard) that bedevil conventional insurance. These advantages have sparked considerable interest in index insurance for poor regions otherwise lacking formal insurance access (Barnett and Mahul 2007) .
The advantages of reduced transaction costs and asymmetric information problems, however, come at the cost of increased "basis risk", the imperfect correlation between an insured's loss experience and the behavior of the underlying index on which the index insurance contract is written. A contract holder may experience losses but not receive a payout if the overall index is not triggered. Conversely, the aggregate experience may trigger indemnity payments even to insurees who experience no loss.
Given this tradeoff between basis risk and reduced incentive problems and transactions costs, the impact of index insurance on well-being remains unknown, especially in the case of index insurance on assets that determine the time path of future earnings and welfare. And because index insurance is so new, with limited uptake and predictable questions about the quality of the initial contracts, there is no empirical evidence yet as to the impact of index insurance on the well-being of otherwise-uninsured poor populations. This paper offers some initial, ex ante impact assessment findings related to a specific index insurance contract that is scheduled to go on sale in early 2010.
It also offers an innovative approach to establishing the welfare effects of and willingness to pay for asset insurance and demonstrates how the presence of asset thresholds associated with poverty traps can affect insurance valuation and performance.
The arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of east Africa are among the poorest regions on Earth, with severe (less than $1/day) poverty rates routinely in excess of 75%. Given meager rainfall and infrastructure, the pastoralist populations who inhabit these areas rely heavily on extensive livestock grazing for their livelihood. Recent economic research, building on extensive prior ethnographic work, finds that east African pastoralists operate in an environment characterized by multiple herd size equilibria characteristic of poverty traps (Lybbert et al. 2004 , Barrett et al. 2006 . The prominent role that covariate climate risk plays in driving pastoral poverty traps (Santos and Barrett 2007) and growing concern that droughts are driving growing numbers of pastoralists into destitution (Sandford 2006 , Little et al. 2008 , naturally motivated the recent development of index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) against catastrophic herd loss in the northern Kenyan ASAL (Chantarat et al. 2009a ). These IBLI products are being commercially piloted beginning in January 2010.
Like typical insurance, IBLI compensates for livestock loss. But unlike traditional insurance, it only compensates for covariate herd losses that are predicted by the historical relationship with remotely sensed Normalized Differential Vegetation Index (NDVI) measures; an indicator of vegetative cover widely used in drought monitoring programs in Africa. These data are publicly available in near-real time and objectively verifiable. Chantarat et al. (2009a) explain the details of the IBLI contract design and show that it performs extremely well out-of-sample in insuring against catastrophic covariate shocks in this region. In this paper we use household-level panel data to simulate the impact of IBLI on Northern Kenyan pastoral households' welfare dynamics. This paper makes several novel contributions to the literature. First, IBLI insures assets rather than income. Although the overwhelming majority of the global insurance market insures assets through property and casualty, life or health insurance products, most index insurance on offer in the developing world focus on replacing lost income, typically due to rainfall shocks that affect crop production. The loss of productive assets like livestock potentially disrupts future income processes, not just current earnings.
Furthermore, in the presence of a poverty trap, shocks that push herd sizes below a critical threshold at which herd dynamics bifurcate can have especially severe consequences. The point of bifurcation is critical because below this threshold the rate at which the livestock asset is depleted due to death loss far exceeds any short run possibility of rejuvenating the herd. Thus insurance that effectively protects households from slipping into the poverty trap can be of especially high value. Conversely, insurance that consumes scarce resources and fails to protect the household from catastrophic shocks can do damage. Given these considerations, we evaluate IBLI's performance using a dynamic model rather than the usual static approach employed in the existing literature. We show that the effectiveness of IBLI depends on initial herd size relative to the bifurcation threshold as well as, to a lesser degree, on household-specific basis risk and risk preferences.
Second, rather than modeling performance for a representative agent, as is the norm in the extant literature (Skees et al. 2001; Turvey and Nayak 2003; Vedenov and Barnett 2004; Deng 2007) , we explicitly study how IBLI performance varies based on variation in household characteristics, such as initial herd size, and key basis risk and risk preference parameters. And rather than making assumptions about these parameters, we estimate them from panel data and field experiments from the area. Contracts that perform well for a representative household may not prove effective for the majority nor for target sub-populations. We show that to be the case with IBLI.
Third and finally, household-level simulation analysis allows us to compare the outcomes of various subsidization programs and targeting schemes. Our analysis finds that IBLI subsidies targeted toward vulnerable-but-non-poor pastoralists create an effective safety net by protecting such households from slipping into a poverty trap after a drought. This reinforces prior work suggesting that safety net interventions targeting the non-poor can reduce poverty in the long run by stemming the rate of inflow into the ranks of the chronically poor following a shock ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the study locations and the data. Section 3 introduces IBLI. Section 4 then describes the dynamic model we use in the simulations and introduces the certainty equivalent herd growth rate, which we use as a key performance evaluation criterion. Section 5 estimates distributions of basis risk, risk preferences and other key household characteristics necessary for the simulations. Section 6 reports the estimated IBLI performance and how this varies based on identifiable household characteristics. Section 7 estimates households' willingness to pay for the optimal contract and district-level aggregate demand for IBLI. Section 8 then explores how alternative approaches to offering IBLI commercially or with safety net subsidies affect wealth and poverty dynamics in the system. Section 9 concludes.
The Study Area and Data
Extensive livestock grazing represents the key livelihood in the northern Kenyan ASAL.
Pastoralists move their herds in response to spatiotemporal variability in forage and water access. Northern Kenya experiences bimodal rainfall, defined by long rains that fall March-May, followed by a long dry season (June-September) season, then a short rains season from October-December followed by a January-February short dry season. We henceforth refer to the March-September period as the LRLD season (for long rains and long dry), and the October-February period as SRSD (for short rains and short dry).
When the rains fail, especially over two rainy seasons in a row, catastrophic herd losses commonly ensue.
We investigate IBLI performance in Marsabit District, Kenya, for which this product was developed on a pilot basis. We use data from four locations -Dirib Gombo, (PARIMA) project , and a separate survey fielded during May-August 2008 among 42 households in each location (Chantarat et al. 2009c ). The latter survey included field experiments to elicit risk preferences. Gombo and Logologo (Kargi and North Horr). These catastrophic losses were typically due to covariate shocks related to forage and water availability, while modest losses of individual animals were more commonly idiosyncratic experiences (e.g., due to predators or injury). Chantarat et al. (2009a) 
Index Based Livestock Insurance
For IBLI to be commercially viable, the insurance underwriter adds a premium loading 0  a over the actuarially fair rate -i.e., the rate estimated based on the empirical distribution of NDVI -to take into account administrative costs, model uncertainty and required profit margins. The loaded premium rate for coverage season t and location l, quoted as a percentage of total insured herd value, can therefore be calculated as 2 The average premium loading for agricultural insurance contracts is in the range of 30-50%. See, for example, the USDA Risk Management Agency's or the Farmdoc's Premium Estimator for available
The left panel of Table 2 summarizes the predicted mortality index ) ( lt ndvi M for each of the four study locations constructed using the full NDVI series available from 1982-2008 and the livestock mortality forecasting model developed by Chantarat et al. (2009a) . The predicted herd mortality indices average 8-9%. The right panel of Table 2 also shows the actuarially fair IBLI premium rate, which varies across locations due to differences in the distributions of predicted herd mortality index. In what follows, we use 54 seasons of predicted area average herd mortality and the associated fair premium rates to evaluate IBLI performance.
Analytical Framework
With this simple background on the region, the data and IBLI behind us, we now develop a simple dynamic model that accommodates the nonlinear, bifurcated herd dynamics previously observed in the region, with a critical herd size threshold typically in the range of 10-20 tropical livestock units (TLU) 3 (Lybbert et al. 2004 , McPeak 2004 , Barrett et al. 2006 , Santos and Barrett 2007 . This model generates multiple welfare equilibria, the lowest of which is associated with a poverty trap. As will be clear, the presence of the threshold affects the valuation of IBLI conditional on a household's current herd size.
A Stylized Model of Bifurcated Livestock Dynamics
Denote the herd size, in TLU, realized by household i in location l at the beginning of 
Managing Mortality Risk with IBLI
IBLI compensates for covariate livestock mortality loss based on the predicted herd mortality index in each location, ) (
. For simplicity, we assume that the household insures either all or none of their herd at the start of each season, which enables us to compare fully insured herds under several contract specifications against the case of no insurance. The insured herd size realized at the end of coverage season t for a household in location l can thus be written as
where ilt g represents the non-mortality component in the net growth rate in (3).
IBLI thus reduces expected net herd growth in good seasons by the IBLI premium, a lt  , but IBLI should at least partially compensate for losses during periods of substantial covariate herd mortality through the indemnity payment, lt  . Given certain cost and uncertain benefit, the household-specific basis risk with respect to the contract 7 Another approach concentrates on measuring changes in the distribution of the insured outcome based on mean-variance measures, e.g., coefficient of variation, value at risk and downside risk measures (Skees et al. 2001; Turvey and Nayak 2003; Vedenov and Barnett 2004) . Since that approach ignores the insuree's risk preferences, it may misestimate the benefit of insurance (Fishburn 1977; Breustedt et al. 2008) .
is thus a key determinant of IBLI performance. According to (1) and (7)  , the larger the basis risk.
Our analytical framework thus emphasizes the standard theoretical result that the risk management effectiveness of any IBLI contract specification,  
depends on household-specific variation in these key basis risk determinants and risk preferences. A critical innovation with this approach is that the presence of a threshold-based poverty trap further implies that IBLI performance also depends on household herd size. This analytical framework serves as the basis for the estimation and simulation in Section 5.
Threshold-based IBLI Performance
In order to show analytically how IBLI valuation might deviate from the standard insurance evaluation in the presence of bifurcated asset dynamics, we discretize the nonlinear net herd growth in (4) into a simple additive form:
and P P y probabilit y probabilit with ) and the uncovered component with 0
, this implies the expected herd dynamics:
This allows us to derive recursively two stable intertemporal welfare levels:
into the poverty trap, a long-run equilibrium herd size close to zero.
We consider the expected impact of IBLI when pastoralists can insure all of their herds at period t with a contract priced at lt  that pays lt  in a bad season with
and pays nothing during a good season with probability P. Holding risk preferences and basis risk determinants constant, we will show that the dynamic welfare effect of an IBLI contract varies with initial herd sizes at time t. In particular, four distinct cohorts emerge.
(1) For the first cohort, IBLI cannot alter their herd dynamics. Their beginning herd size is too far beneath the critical herd size threshold to grow past * H by the end of the season since even in a good season and without insurance
IBLI only provides typical insurance in reducing the probability of herd loss during a bad season, while the premium payment speeds up herd decumulation during good seasons.
By (6), the IBLI valuation is the same as that in the standard insurance case without bifurcated asset dynamics:
For this cohort, the value of IBLI (reflected in a positive risk premium growth rate) depends on the extent to which IBLI imperfectly compensates for the insured's losses and household-specific risk preferences. However, since households in this cohort converge to the low-level equilibrium with or without insurance, IBLI offers them relatively little in the way of economic relief.
(2) The second cohort consists of pastoralists expecting to grow their herds.
Beginning herd sizes are modestly above * H and grow if the season is good and when they do not pay the insurance premium. However, paying the insurance premium drops them beneath
in a good season. Because IBLI shifts down their herd growth trajectory, the risk premium growth rate is effectively taxed by 1 1
, as is evident from the certainty equivalent growth rate:
The value of IBLI is therefore lower than it would be absent the bifurcated herd dynamics, holding risk preference and basis risk determinants constant. 
Since IBLI preserves their herd growth trajectory, IBLI increases their insurance valuation relative to the case without bifurcated asset dynamics by the factor
For this reason, the dynamic welfare impact of IBLI for this cohort is 
Overall, cohorts three and four -the wealthier segments of this at risk populationrepresent the main source of demand for IBLI in this setting. The expected thresholdbased performance of IBLI in the presence of bifurcated wealth dynamics mirrors the patterns found in Lybbert and Barrett (forthcoming) in a different poverty trap model that does not consider insurance options.
Empirical Estimation and Simulation
In what follows, we simulate households' herd dynamics and key performance determinants -household risk preferences and basis risk -as a first step towards exploring the effectiveness of IBLI contracts over many sets of seasons, with different initial seasonal outcomes.
The main component in estimating and simulating herd dynamics is the net herd growth rate in (3). We estimate the non-mortality component separately from the mortality component as we are particularly interested in estimating the key basis risk determinants directly from the correlations between individual households' livestock mortality and the location-specific predicted herd loss index that triggers IBLI payout.
We first estimate non-mortality component of the seasonal livestock growth function in ( Next, we estimate the relationship between household-specific herd mortality rates and the location-average predicted mortality index described in (8). We pool four seasons of household-specific mortality rates across the four 2000-2 study locations. A linear relationship between deviations of the two from their long-term means is then estimated using a random coefficient model with random effects on the slope coefficient, commonly known as "beta".
This model, estimated by maximum likelihood, allows us to take into account variations of slope coefficients across households.
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The estimated slope coefficient represents the degree of sensitivity of household's mortality loss to the predicted 9 Epanechnikov kernel function is used and the optimal bandwidth is chosen according to Silverman's Rule of Thumb. 10 Growth rates were constructed using observations on births, purchases, borrowing and lending of animals, exchanges, sales, slaughters and transfers.
11 Estimation of models of beta-representation (e.g., the CAPM model in financial econometrics) generally rely on the seemingly unrelated regressions model for sector-specific equations, which allows for unrestricted error structures (e.g., due to potentially cross-sectional correlations). IBLI in spite of the product's very strong out-of-sample performance (Chantarat et al. 12 The intercept for this model is zero by construction. 13 The overall average herd sizes observed from 2000-2002 and 2007-2008 are used as representatives of the beginning herd sizes in the four locations. 14 Though our estimations and simulations from this point on were location-specific, we report overall results. Some location-specific results are reported in the Appendices; the rest can be requested from the authors. 15 Because (16) implies the estimated household beta only with respect to the the hedgeable mortality index, this does not have to be centered at one, unlike the estimated household beta with respect to areaaverage losses -such as is commonly used in agricultural finance literature for measuring basis risk (Carter et al. 2007; Miranda 1991 16 We use the location-specific distribution of ilt e since we do not have enough individual data to simulate the individual-specific distributions. mortality index, and a location-specific uncovered risk component. These stylized households allow us to better understand how basis risk and initial herd sizes influence IBLI's impact on herd dynamics.
We are now ready to analyze the effectiveness of IBLI by simply comparing herd dynamics with and without IBLI. We construct 54 pseudo sets of 54 consecutive seasons from the existing vegetation data letting each observation serve as an initial period once in a revolving 54-season sequence with the working assumption that these 54 seasons repeat themselves in sequence.
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This allows us to evaluate performance of IBLI taking into account different possible initial realizations of stochastic range conditions. We consider five IBLI contracts with five strike levels of five percent increments from 10-30%. Households are assumed to insure their entire herd. For each contract, we simulate the resulting insured herd dynamics based on (7) using the distribution of location-specific seasonal predicted mortality index ) ( lt ndvi M and the location-specific premium rate shown in Table 2 .
As we compute the value of insurance based on the expected utility approach, the certainty equivalent herd growth depends on household discount rates and risk preferences. For simplicity, we assume no discounting, 1   . We calibrate householdspecific CRRA parameters based on a simple experimental lottery game run among the households in June-July 2008. Our risk elicitation game follows the simple method used in Binswanger (1980 Binswanger ( , 1981 ; Eckel and Grossman (2002) ; Barr (2003) and Dave et al. (2007) . Households were first given 100 Ksh for participating. Then we introduced five lotteries, which vary by risk and expected return. Respondents were invited to use their 100 Ksh to play one of the five lotteries for a real prize, if they wished. If they decided to pay 100 Ksh to play, they were then asked to choose their most preferred lottery to play.
A fair coin was then tossed to determine their prize. Six categories of risk aversion associated with six (geometric mean) coefficients of relative risk aversion,{0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.4, 0.7, 1}, were derived based on households' choices (Chantarat et al. 2009c ).
Appendix 4 summarizes the results of this risk preference elicitation experiment. For each location, we then randomly assign each simulated household with one of the six CRRA parameters based on the observed wealth strata specific distributions of CRRA. Figure 6 depicts some key patterns of insured herd dynamics, using Kargi and 1   as an example. Panels (a) to (e) each reflect the cumulative distributions of uninsured and insured herd sizes for a single household over a set of 54 simulated seasons.
The Effectiveness of IBLI for Managing Livestock Asset Risk
Panel (a) shows that IBLI does little for pastoralists with a low beginning herd size (e.g., 5 TLU). IBLI cannot prevent these households from falling into destitution given how far they are beneath the critical herd growth threshold (~15 TLU). Indeed, paying an insurance premium each season without offsetting indemnities slightly accelerates herd collapse.
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Varying patterns of IBLI performance emerge for pastoralists with herd sizes around the critical herd threshold, i.e., for those whose herd dynamics are very sensitive to shocks. Panel (b) represents a pastoralist with an initial herd size of 15 TLU immediately at or slightly below the critical threshold. This pastoralist was hit by large covariate shocks that so disrupted his asset accumulation that he ended on a decumulating growth path without insurance. But with IBLI imperfectly compensating for the losses, decumulation was averted, and the result was a stabilized growth trajectory.
Because IBLI changes his herd dynamics by insuring against catastrophic collapse, the certainty equivalent herd growth associated with IBLI should be relatively high due to the added effect of the bifurcated herd dynamics in the system. Panel (c) presents the opposite case, in which a pastoralist with the same initial herd size of 15 TLU could slowly climb onto the herd growth trajectory during good vegetative seasons if he did not pay an IBLI premium. If his luck holds, he could escape the poverty trap without IBLI; the premium payments in this case actually retard 18 Our model assumes away possible indirect benefits of IBLI, such as its potential to crowd in finance for ancillary investment and growth. If IBLI crowds in credit access, it may alter the growth trajectory and the critical herd size threshold, opening up the possibility that IBLI benefits the least well-off pastoralists as well. Our data do not permit credible parameterization of such shifts, so we abstract from them in this analysis.
progress. The difference between panels (b) and (c) purely reflect the ex post effects due to random draws of seasonal condition and reflect the great value of insurance when it proves to have been needed, and also the adverse effects on those who enjoyed a streak of good luck.
Panel (d) presents the case of a pastoralist with 20 TLU, who would be vulnerable to shocks that could knock him onto the decumulation trajectory in the absence of effective insurance. Indeed, we see that for vulnerable households just above the critical herd size threshold, well-designed IBLI can effectively move them away from the poverty trap, substantially lessening the probability of herd size collapse. This is the population that benefits most, in expectation, from IBLI.
Panel (e) depicts the common pattern of IBLI performance for pastoralists with large initial herd sizes -e.g., 30 TLU -who face little immediate danger of falling into destitution. IBLI contracts provide typical insurance, reducing the probability of herd losses, while seasonal premium payments also reduce the chance of reaching extremely large herd sizes. This simply reflects the second-order stochastic dominance of the insured herd sizes relative to the uninsured.
The ex ante wealth impacts on IBLI performance shown in Figure 6 , however, holds constant other household-and location-specific characteristics that determine a household's basis risk exposure associated with IBLI.
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Holding other things equal, pastoralists with low (high) beta will tend to over (under) insure their herd losses with IBLI, and so they end up paying higher (lower) prices for IBLI that offer unnecessary (insufficient) compensation for their losses, on average. IBLI performance should vary based on the location-specific distributions of uncovered asset risk and the distributions of covariate shocks. On average, IBLI performance will be higher among households with lower dispersion of uncovered risk, i.e., less basis risk. In addition, IBLI performance is also expected to be higher among households in the locations with a higher probability of insurable covariate losses, i.e., greater risk exposure covered by insurance.
We now consider the performance of actuarially fair IBLI contracts conditional on contract specifications and household characteristics. Table 3 reports the change in certainty equivalent herd growth rate (also referred to as the positive risk premium growth rate) associated with IBLI for 15 stylized households (with individual mean mortality fixed at the location-averaged mean predicted mortality index) in each of the four locations.
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Various interesting results emerge.
First, we observe that IBLI performance varies with beginning herd sizes, confirming the patterns shown in Figure 6 . IBLI gains are negligible for pastoralists with the lowest herd sizes (5 TLU) and highest for those with the herd sizes around the critical herd threshold (e.g., 15-20 TLU). IBLI does not seem well suited for the poorest herders, whose low endowments leave them trapped by the underlying dynamics of the system, not by uninsured risk exposure. By contrast, those with marginally viable herd sizes are especially susceptible to shocks thus insurance is potentially of considerable benefit to them.
Second, IBLI performance tends to improve as beta increases, holding other things equal. This implies that over-insuring tends to have far larger adverse impact on herd dynamics than does underinsuring. Indeed, IBLI typically benefits most those with beta=1.5 rather than those whose herd sizes tend to move one-for-one with local averages. Households with greater-than-average risk exposure (e.g., beta>1) find IBLI especially valuable, despite only-partial coverage from IBLI.
Finally, these simulations suggest that the IBLI contract with a 10% strike level outperforms other contracts, on average, even though the 10% strike contract is more costly than the others. The greater protection apparently is worth it given the risk of falling beneath the critical herd size threshold. This effect is most pronounced for those with initial herd sizes just above the threshold (at 20 TLU), whose vulnerability to shocks is best addressed with a low strike insurance contract.
Having observed how variations in household-specific characteristics could affect individual-level IBLI performance, we now explore how the observed location-specific distributions of those characteristics affect IBLI performance at a more aggregate scale. On average, certainty equivalent herd growth increases only modestly with increasing risk aversion.
In general, effective demand for IBLI (e.g., positive risk premium herd growth rate) exists in all locations for IBLI contracts with less than a 30% strike, with the highest demand for the 10% strike contract. But not everyone benefits. Figure 7 presents the cumulative distributions of the improvement in certainty equivalent growth rates with respect to three different IBLI contracts in these four locations. At least half the households benefit from an IBLI contract with a 10% strike (slightly lower proportions for other strike levels) with the positive risk premium growth rates associated with the contract ranging up to almost 100%. The distribution of valuations for the 10% contract clearly dominates that of the other contracts in these locations.
Willingness to Pay and Potential Demand for IBLI
The preceding analysis offers a glimpse into prospective demand patterns for IBLI. So far, we have explored the performance of IBLI contracts sold at actuarially fair premium rates. But an insurer needs to add a commercial loading. This will change the impact of IBLI on herd dynamics by changing the premium paid for insurance. We can use this same simulation model to estimate demand for IBLI by searching for the a lt  that drives the risk premium growth rate to zero. In this section, we explore demand for the 10% strike IBLI contract previously shown to have the greatest expected benefit for most pastoralists in the region. 21 These two measures are used widely in the mean-variance evaluation approach of agricultural insurance. Downside risk reduction is measured by semi-variance reduction of the insured herd dynamics with IBLI relative to the uninsured herd. Specifically, semi-variance of the insured herd dynamics over a set of Aggregate demand for IBLI seems very price elastic with reduction in quantity demanded by 55% as the fair premium rate is loaded by 20%, and a further 26% reduction with an additional 20% premium loading. If the commercially viable IBLI contract rate is set at a 20% loading, these highly elastic aggregate demand patterns show potential aggregate demand of approximately 210,000 TLU in Marsabit District alone.
These patterns highlight several points. First, large herd owners will be the key drivers of a commercially sustainable IBLI product. Second, the apparent price elasticity of demand in these locations implies that a small premium reduction (e.g., through subsidization)
can potentially induce large increases in quantity demanded. For example, as Figure 9 shows, a decrease in premium loading from 40% to 20% could potentially induce more than a doubling of aggregate demand. Third, while IBLI appears most valuable for the most vulnerable pastoralists (those with herd sizes around 10-30 TLU) as it could protect their herd dynamics from catastrophic shock, most of their WTP lies well below the commercially loaded IBLI premium (i.e., at least a 20% loading). This, as we showed in Figure 6 panel (c), is due to the possibility that high premium payments will impede herd accumulation across the herd growth threshold.
Premium subsidization may therefore be important if it is socially desirable to stimulate IBLI uptake among vulnerable populations. Might IBLI subsidies provide a cost-effective and productive safety net in broader social protection programs sponsored by governments or donors? That is the final question we explore using these simulation models.
Enhancing Productive Safety Nets Using IBLI
In order to investigate whether IBLI subsidies might effectively provide a productive safety net for pastoralists in northern Kenya, we first explore herd and poverty dynamic outcomes (using an asset poverty line of 10 TLU) of these 2000 simulated pastoralists under four different scenarios: (i) without insurance, (ii) with commercially loaded IBLI (assuming a 20% premium), (iii) with an optimally targeted premium subsidization scheme that maximizes asset poverty reduction outcomes, and (iv) with comparable, needs-based subsidization targeted to the poorest households with less than 20 TLU.
The targeted premium subsidization scheme is optimized by searching for the combination of subsidized premium rates targeted to different herd groups -(a) the poorest (<10 TLU), (b) the non-poor likely to fall into poverty in the longer run (10-20 TLU), (c) the vulnerable non-poor (20-30 TLU), (d) the secure pastoralists and (e) the large-scale pastoralists with >50 TLU -that yields the lowest poverty outcomes. The results (details available by request) imply that the optimal premium subsidization scheme would provide IBLI free to group (b) and at the actuarially fair premium rate for the vulnerable non-poor groups (c) and (d), with no subsidization to groups (a) and (e). We compare this with two needs-based schemes: subsidized to the fair rate %) 0 (  a and free provision targeted to the less well off pastoralists with herd sizes less than 20 TLU.
In each of these scenarios, the simulated household herd at the end of each season reflects the household's optimal insurance choice -i.e., insure if (induced) WTP exceeds the (subsidized) premium rate, do not insure otherwise. Therefore, the herd outcomes for the case of strictly commercial IBLI, for example, largely represent the outcomes of the insured herds of the well off pastoralists who demand WTP even at commercial rates and the uninsured herds of the rest of the population. The commercially loaded IBLI without subsidization, which only attracts a majority of the well-off pastoralists, has very limited effect on poverty. Average herd sizes under this scenario closely track the no-insurance case, with only modest increases largely among insured, well-off pastoralists partially protected from shocks by IBLI.
By contrast, under the optimal subsidy scheme, mean herd sizes increase more than 80%, relative to the no insurance case, over the course of a quarter century.
Likewise, the asset poverty headcount decreases slightly over time and stabilizes at a level about 10% lower than without insurance. Subsidized IBLI protects many targeted pastoralists herds against collapse beneath the critical growth threshold.
The most distributionally progressive, strictly need-based schemes achieve less than half of these optimal outcomes. While they follow similar (herd size increasing and poverty decreasing) patterns, we still observe increasing poverty headcounts even with free IBLI for the poorest. This simply reflects the fact that IBLI provides little benefit for pastoralists with low herd sizes or with high basis risk exposure. Perhaps counterintuitively, allocating scarce resources to subsidize the vulnerable non-poor may do more to keep long-term poverty headcount rates down than allocating the same resources to the poorest.
In this simple simulation, the average cost of the optimal targeted subsidization scheme, which reaches 20%-50% of the population over 54 historical seasons, is roughly $50 per beneficiary per six-month season.
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This implies a $20 per capita cost per one percent reduction in the poverty headcount rate, in contrast to $38 for the needs-based
scheme. An effective safety net can be both cheaper and more effective in stemming long-run poverty than traditional transfer programs ).
Conclusions
Covariate livestock mortality is a key source of vulnerability among east African pastoralists and often drives households into extreme persistent poverty. In the presence of poverty traps resulting from well-documented nonlinear herd growth dynamics in the region, effective risk management becomes potentially important as a means of reducing long-term poverty rates. This paper offers novel dynamic estimates of the welfare effects of a new index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) product developed to address precisely this problem; IBLI is scheduled for pilot sales in early 2010 in northern Kenya.
Our analysis adds to the current literature because of our focus on asset riskrather than income risk -and the existence of bifurcated asset dynamics in the northern Kenyan pastoral system. These two characteristics require important innovations in ex ante impact assessment of insurance. We develop a dynamic simulation model and a modified expected utility-based evaluation criterion in order to take into account the potential dynamic impact of IBLI. We use household-level parameter estimates including household-specific risk preferences elicited from field experiments as well as basis risk parameters estimated from panel data from the region to explore a) key patterns of variation in IBLI performance, b) patterns of willingness to pay, and c) the aggregate demand for IBLI.
We find that household initial herd size -i.e., ex ante wealth -is the key determinant of IBLI performance, more so than household risk preferences or basis risk exposure. IBLI works least well for the poorest, whose meager endowments effectively condemn them to herd collapse given prevailing herd dynamics. By contrast, IBLI is most valuable for the vulnerable non-poor, for whom insurance can stem collapses onto a trajectory of herd decumulation following predictable shocks.
We find that a 10% strike contract consistently outperforms higher strike level contracts. District-level aggregate demand appears highly price elastic with potentially limited demand for contracts with commercially viable premium loadings. Because willingness to pay is especially price sensitive among the most vulnerable pastoralists (i.e. those not currently caught in a poverty trap, but on the verge of falling into one) for whom the product is potentially most beneficial, subsidization of asset insurance as a safety net intervention may prove worthwhile. Simple simulations find that relatively inexpensive, partial subsidization targeted to households with herd sizes in specific ranges can significantly increase average wealth and decrease poverty, at a rate of just $20 per capita per one percent reduction in the poverty headcount rate. Note: % Migration represents the percentage of the household herd that moves at least once over the year. 1 TLU is worth approximately 12,000 KSh, equivalent to roughly US$160 based on October 2009 exchange rates (75.05Ksh/US$). Income is calculated from the sum of market value of milk and meat production, crop production, livestock trading, business, salary earnings, casual labor wage and other petty trading. The conditional herd mortality rates are also plotted here to illustrate that during the good seasons, more households enjoy positive net growth rates (i.e., mortality rate below non-mortality growth rate), while those above the critical herd size threshold of 12-20 animals maintain just slightly above zero growth during the bad seasons. Santos and Barrett (2007) Estimated (2000) (2001) (2002) (2007) (2008) Observed (2000) (2001) (2002) (2007) (2008) Appendix 3: Summary of Baseline Simulation Results The value R = 0 is associated with a risk neutral household, while R <0 indicates a risk seeker.
Following Binswanger (1980) , we assign a mean CRRA measures to each of the ranges using the geometric mean of the two end points.
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In the case of gamble 6, a value of zero is given to the CRRA measure to represent a class of risk neutral or risk seeker. The value of one is then assigned to the case of gamble 1 to represent the extremely risk averse class. We then assign each household to one of the six risk aversion classifications (extreme, severe, intermediate, moderate, low/neutral and neutral/risk seeker). Below are plots the cumulative distributions of CRRA associated with each of the three livestock wealth strata used in the 2008 survey. 25 In our setting, we truncated R at the maximum value of 1 as we only consider CRRA class utility function that is increasing. Value of R greater than 1 will yield negative value of utility. 26 For the case of gamble 5 with one of the end point at zero, arithmetic mean was chosen in this case.
